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Abstract—Emerging new applications demand the current
Internet to provide new functionalities. Although many future
Internet architectures and protocols have been proposed to fulfill
such needs, ISPs have been reluctant to deploy these architec-
tures. We believe technical issues are not the main reasons as
many of these new proposals are technically sound. In this paper,
we take an economic perspective and seek to answer: Why most
new Internet architectures failed to be deployed? What makes a new
architecture easier to deploy? We develop a game-theoretic model
to characterize the outcome of an architecture’s deployment
through the equilibrium of ISP’s decisions. We also use our model
to explain the deploying outcomes of IPv6, DiffServ, CDN, etc.,
and the “Internet flattening phenomenon”. Furthermore, one can
use our model to predict the deployability of new architectures
such as NDN, XIA, and compare the deployability of competing
architectures. Our study also suggests that the architectures
which try to make a fresh start may have a low deployability,
unless they have efficient incremental deployment mechanisms or
one introduces a centralized coordinator to help the deployment.
I. Introduction
There is always a constant push for the Internet to be “evolv-
able” so as to support new applications with new functional-
ities. For example, huge amount of streaming video traffics
from Netflix require highly efficient content delivery across
the Internet. Also, users of online social network services like
Facebook want their private chats to be securely protected.
Moreover, the increasing number of mobile phones and IoT
devices require better mobility and security support. However,
many of these needs are not being supported by the IPv4
network. To support these emerging needs, researchers have
been developing new architectures and protocols, and more
importantly, exploring how to make the Internet “evolvable”
so to incorporate new functionalities. Unfortunately, many of
these research efforts fail to lead to wide scale deployment.
In 1990s, the protocol IPv6 was designed to improve IPv4.
In particular, IPv6 aims to provide more addresses and new
features such as security. However, after 20 years of effort,
less than 20% of the current Internet traffic is using IPv6[1].
Differentiated service (DiffServ)[2] was designed to provide
QoS guarantee. Although it is supported by many commercial
routers[2], only few Internet service providers (ISPs) are
willing to turn on the DiffServ functions. In contrast, the
content delivery network (CDN)[3] technology enjoys a rapid
growth of deployment. Now, over 50% of the Internet traffic is
delivered by CDNs[3]. In the past decade, a number of future
Internet architectures, e.g., NDN and XIA, were proposed
and they wanted to make fundamental changes to the current
IP network. NDN[4] natively facilitates content distribution,
while XIA[5] provides intrinsic security and enables incre-
mental deployment of future technologies. MobilityFirst[6]
aims to support mobile devices. Although NDN, XIA and
MobilityFirst all have functional prototype systems, up to the
writing of this paper, they still lack the wide-scale deployment.
All of the above architecture/protocol proposals claimed to
improve the current Internet if they are successfully deployed.
However, only the CDN technology is smoothly deployed in
the Internet, while most of the others are not. This motivates
us to explore: Why most new Internet architectures failed to
be deployed? What makes a new architecture/protocol easier
to deploy? It is interesting to note that the deployment failure
of many proposed architectures/protocols is not due to the
technical issue. In fact, many of these proposed architectures
have superior designs than the present IPv4 network. Instead,
we argue that “economic issues” are often crucial in deciding
the deployability of any new Internet architecture or protocol.
Fig. 1: Economic difficulty to deploy a new Internet architecture
To illustrate, let us consider the following example. Fig. 1
depicts a simple network with three ISPs. There is a traffic
flow from ISP 1 to ISP 3. Let’s say under the current Internet
architecture, the whole network can gain a total revenue of $20.
Suppose a new Internet architecture, if it is fully deployed, will
increase the total revenue of the whole network to $32 (i.e.,
improve the revenue by $12). Each ISP has a launching cost
of $3 to deploy this new architecture. Suppose the revenue
improvement is evenly distributed among ISPs, i.e., each ISP
gains $12/3=$4, or each ISP will earn $4 more by investing
$3 to upgrade the architecture, which yields a net gain of
$4-$3=$1. However, the deployment requires a “full-path”
participation, i.e. ISP 1, ISP 2 and ISP3 all need to deploy,
otherwise the functionality of this new architecture will not be
enabled. Fig. 1 shows that when only ISP 1 and ISP 2 deploy
(ISP 3 does not deploy), the total revenue will not be improved
as the new functionality is not enabled.
Although the above example illustrates the potential profit
gain for each ISP, unfortunately, the new architecture will not
necessarily be deployed in the network. The reason is that
ISPs are not certain that they will reap any benefit if they
alone decide to deploy the new architecture. In fact, if an
ISP deploys, she will gain $1 only if the other two ISPs
will also deploy such architecture, otherwise the ISP will
lose $3. The main difficulty is that an ISP cannot be certain
that other ISPs will make a similar decision on deployment.
Given the uncertainty of others’ participation, ISPs tend to be
conservative and this will lead to the failure of deployment.
The above example highlights that a new Internet architecture
can be difficult to deploy even if it can bring higher profits.
This paper studies the economic issues for the deployment
of new Internet architecture/protocol, and we aim to answer:
• Why many new Internet architectures/protocols, e.g.,
IPv6, NDN, XIA, failed to receive large scale acceptance
and wide deployment by ISPs?
• Under what conditions a new Internet architecture can be
successfully deployed? How to compare multiple compet-
ing architectures and protocols?
In addition, we analyze the economic impact of some engi-
neering mechanisms, e.g., tunneling, that were proposed for the
incremental deployment of new Internet architectures. We also
study the “Internet flattening phenomenon”, where content
providers are bypassing ISPs but instead, place their servers
in data centers close to the end users. Our contributions are:
• We build economic models to quantify the condition for
a new Internet architecture to be deployed by ISPs. Our
model also allows us to compare the deployability of
competing architectures and see which one will win.
• Our model indicates that a profitable new architecture
may not be widely deployed, and a superior architecture
may lose to another competing architecture. It explains
why architectures like IPv6, DiffServ are difficult to
deploy, while deploying CDN, NAT is easy.
• We quantify how incremental deployment mechanisms
such as IPv6 tunneling improve the deployability of an
architecture. Furthermore, we show by relying on data
centers, content providers will be easier to deploy new
architectures in the flattened Internet. We also show how
an architecture that is originally not deployable could be
deployed, by a centralized economic mechanism.
II. System Model
A. Model of The Internet Network
We use an undirected graph G,(N , E) to characterize the
inter-connections between ISPs. The node set N,{1, . . . , N}
denotes the set of all ISPs. Each node corresponds to one
ISP, and physically consists of all the routers, switches, etc.,
operated by that ISP. Fig. 2 illustrates a set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
of four ISPs, where ISP 1 has one router, ISP 2 has three
routers, etc. The edge set E⊆{(i, j)|i, j∈N , i<j} indicates
the connectivity among ISPs, where we require i<j to elim-
inate the redundancy of the same undirected edges (i, j)
and (j, i). If two ISPs are inter-connected, then there is a
physical link between them. For example, in Fig. 2, we have
E={(1, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4)}.
Fig. 2: Flows via the routers Fig. 3: Flows via the ISPs
We define a flow as an aggregation of all the traffic of
packets along a route. Formally, we use the vector of all
traversed ISPs along the route f,(s, . . ., t) to represent a flow,
where nodes are ordered according to the direction of the flow
such that s∈N denotes the source node and t∈N denotes the
destination node. For example, Fig. 2 depicts the routing path
of flow 1 over all the routers (or switches). Fig. 3 hides the
details of routers, and shows that flow 1 goes through ISPs 3,
2, 4, 2 and 1, accordingly f1=(3,2,4,2,1). In this example, the
flow has a twisted routes which goes through ISP 2 more than
once. We allow such duplication of nodes in a flow f to capture
the full interactions among ISPs induced by network traffics.
Let F denote the set of all the Internet traffic flows. In Fig. 3,
we have F={f1, f2}={(3,2,4,2,1), (4,2,3)}. As one will see
later, this flow representation facilitates the analysis of ISPs’
economic behaviors. Note that our flow representation reflects
its routing path rather than its traffic volume, while our model
applies to flows with arbitrary traffic volume. Note that in
reality, if some ISPs of a flow do not deploy the new protocol,
then in the routing path, these ISPs might be replaced by other
ISPs who deploy the new protocol. In this paper, we do not
consider the change of routing path, because the change of
routing path is not a reason why deploying a new architecture
is difficult as shown in our technical report[7].
B. Model of Future Internet Architecture
Launching cost. Let ci ∈ R+ denote the launching cost to
deploy a new architecture, i.e. the money needed to start the
new architecture. It captures the expenses to purchase new
hardware, to upgrade software, and to pay for engineers who
use the new architecture, etc. Some expenses to operate the
new architecture occur immediately after the deployment, so
we also include them in the launching cost. We assume that
the upgrading is indivisible, i.e., an ISP either upgrades all its
network or upgrades none. If an ISP divides its network into
multiple sub-networks and each sub-network independently
decides whether to deploy, one can regard each sub-network
as an ISP in our model. In Appendix A, we show that allowing
such divisions of ISPs will not affect our results on whether
an architecture will be successfully deployed.
Revenue Improvement. ISPs earn revenue from customers
(e.g. end users or content providers). With new functionalities
of the new architecture, the customers may be willing to pay
more. We aim to quantify the improvement of revenue from the
new architecture after the deployment. Let R(H,S) denote the
total revenue generated from a set of flows H⊆F when a set
S of ISPs deploy the new architecuture. In particular, R(H, ∅)
is the total revenue from flows H when no ISP deploy the new
architecture, or, the total revenue from the current architecture.
Assumption 1. For all H1,H2⊆F ,H1∩H2=∅, it holds that
R(H1 ∪H2,S) = R(H1,S) +R(H2,S).
Assumption 1 implies that the total revenue of the whole
network G is the summation of the revenue generated by each
individual flow, i.e., R(F ,S) =
∑
f∈F R({f},S).
The revenue of a flow depends on to what extend the
functionality is enabled. The enabling of a new functionality
depends on how many ISPs deploy the new architecture.
Definition 1. An ISP i ∈ N is a critical ISP to a flow f , if its
action (deploy or not) influences the functionality of the new
architecture for the flow f ; otherwise, it is non-critical.
Let C(f) denote a set of all critical ISPs to flow f . Namely,
to utilize the functionality of a new architecture on a flow f , all
ISPs in C(f) must deploy the new architecture. For example,
consider flow f1 in Fig. 3. To utilize the functionality of a
network-layer protocol like IPv6 in flow f1, the set of critical
ISPs is C(f1) = {1, 2, 3, 4}. To utilize the functionality of
a transport layer protocol like TCP, C(f1) = {1, 3}. Finally,
to have the caching functionality of a CDN service, we have
C(f1)={1}. The reason is that TCP requires only the sender
and the receiver to participate, and for the CDN, only the “last-
mile” ISP that provides the CDN service needs to deploy.
Definition 2. A new architecture requires a full-path partici-
pation, if C(f) contains all ISPs in the flow f , for all f ∈ F .
IPv6 requires full-path participation while TCP and CDN do
not. Let n(f ,S),|C(f)∩S| denote the number of critical ISPs
of f who participate in the deployment.
Incremental deployment mechanisms were developed to
enable the functionality of a new architecture when not all
critical ISPs participate in the deployment. A good example
is “IPv6 tunneling”, where tunnels are built to bypass those
IPv4 ISPs so that IPv6 packets could be delivered.
Assumption 2. Given S, T ⊆N , the function R(·, ·) satisfies:
1) R({f},S) ≤ R({f}, T ) if S ⊆ T ;
2) R({f},S) = R({f}, ∅), if the new architecture has no
incremental deployment mechanisms and n(f ,S)<|C(f)|.
3) R({f},S) ≥ R({f}, ∅), if we could apply incremental
deployment mechanisms to the new architecture.
Assumption 2 captures that: (1) The revenue generated
from a flow is non-decreasing as more ISPs deploy the
new architecture; (2) Suppose the new architecture cannot be
incrementally deployed, then the revenue from a flow will not
be changed if any critical ISPs for this flow do not deploy
the new architecture. (3) If there are incremental deployment
mechanisms, then the new architecture partially works without
complete deployment, and ISPs’ revenue might be improved.
Note that 2) in Assumption 2 may depart from reality.
This assumption ignores the decline of revenue from the old
architecture due to the competition of the new architecture. In
reality, ISPs’ adoption of new architecture might hurt their
revenue from the flows that use the old architecture. This
reflects to the notion of “self-cannibalism”, which was thought
to be a reason why ISPs are reluctant to deploy. In this paper,
we focus on the baseline case where R({f},S)=R({f}, ∅). In
Appendix B and Appendix C, we extend our model to show
that “self-cannibalism” and the change of routing path are not
the reasons why an architecture is difficult to deploy.
The performance with incremental deployment mechanisms
depends on how many critical ISPs deploy the new architec-
ture. Let us take the example in Fig. 3, where two ISPs 3 and
4 deploy IPv6 in the flow f2 (while ISP 2 does not). To make
IPv6 feasible in such incremental deployment situation, IPv6
packets need to bypass ISP 2 which uses IPv4. In this flow,
no matter which two ISPs deploy IPv6 (e.g. ISPs 2 and 3), a
IPv6 packet needs to bypass one ISP via tunneling.
Assumption 3. Given S, T ⊆ N , if n(f ,S)=n(f , T ), then
R({f},S)=R({f}, T ).
Assumption 3 captures that the revenue generated from a flow
is determined by the number of critical ISPs who deploy the
new architecture. In fact, Assumption 3 will be automatically
satisfied without incremental deployment mechanisms.
Assumption 4. For all S ⊆ T , i ∈ N and i 6∈ T , it holds
that R(F ,S ∪ {i})−R(F ,S) ≤ R(F , T ∪ {i})−R(F , T ).
Assumption 4 states that as more ISPs have deployed the
new architecture, the marginal revenue gain by adding one
more ISP to deploy the new architecture is larger. Namely,
different ISPs are complementary to generate revenue in the
deployment of the new architecture. Assumption 4 will be
automatically satisfied without incremental deployment mech-
anisms. We denote ISPs’ revenue gain from deployment as
v(S) , R(F ,S)−R(F , ∅), ∀S ⊆ N .
Note that v(∅)=0. Moreover, we are only interested in the
cases where the revenue gain v(S) from deploying the new
architecture is non-negative, as implied by our Assumption 2.
Hence we also call the revenue gain the “benefit”. We next
proceed to analyze ISPs’ non-trivial decisions when v(S)≥0.
III. ISPs’ Strategic Behavior
We characterize the “stable” mechanism for the ISPs to dis-
tribute the revenue gain. Then, we formulate a game to capture
ISPs’ strategic behaviors in deploying the new architecture.
A. Revenue Gain Distribution Mechanism
Currently, ISPs distribute the revenues from the old function-
ality (i.e. the basic packets transmission) according to bilateral
contracts and bilateral peering agreements. The existing con-
tracts and peering agreements are not concerned in this paper.
The unsettled distribution of our interest is on the revenue gain
introduced by new functionalities of the new architecture. Let
φ(S, v)=(φ1, . . ., φN )∈RN≥0 denote a distribution mechanism,
where φi(S,v) is the revenue gain distributed to ISP i∈N .
Distributing the revenue gain is non-trivial, because ISPs
may refuse to deploy the architecture if the revenue gain is
not “fairly” distributed. A “stable” revenue gain distribution
mechanism should satisfy the following four properties.
Property 1 (Efficiency).
∑
i∈S φi(S, v)=v(S).
Fig. 4: Example Flows Fig. 5: Multiple equilibria
It captures that all the revenue gain is only distributed to the
participating ISPs, and nothing remains undistributed.
Property 2 (Symmetry). If i, j ∈ S satisfies v(T ∪ {i}) =
v(T ∪ {j}) for all T ⊆ S\{i, j}, then φi(S, v) = φj(S, v).
This property captures the “fairness”, i.e., if two ISPs have in-
distinguishable contributions, we have no reasons to distribute
more money to one of the ISPs. In fact, these two ISPs have
the same bargaining power during the distribution.
Property 3 (Dummy). If i ∈ S is a dummy ISP, i.e., v(T ) =
v(T ∪ {i}) holds for all T ⊆ S\{i}, then φi(S, v) = 0.
It captures that if an ISP has no contribution to the revenue
gain, then this ISP is dummy and should receive nothing.
Property 4 (Additivity). For two revenue gain functions v and
w, φi(S, v+w) = φi(S, v) + φi(S, w) for any i∈S.
It captures that the distribution of revenue gain from some
new architecture should be consistent no matter whether it is
composed with other orthogonal architecture or not.
As stated in economic theory[8], distributing the revenue
gain according to the Shapley value is the “unique choice” to
satisfy the above four properties. Formally, according to the
Shapley value, each ISP i ∈ S receives a revenue gain of
φi(S, v)=
∑
T ⊆S\{i}
|T |!(|S|−|T |−1)!
|S|!
[v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )]. (1)
Besides the above axiomatic approach, it was also shown[9]
that the Shapley values will be distributed if ISPs are free
to do non-cooperative bargaining. Shapley value has been
applied to study Network Economics problems[10]. Note
that computing the Shapley value is NP-hard in general[11].
Under mild assumptions in Sec. II-B, we have a closed-form
expression of Shapley value.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1 and 3, (1) reduces to
φi(S, v)=
∑
f∈F
1{i∈C(f)}
R({f},S)−R({f}, ∅)
n(f ,S)
, ∀i ∈ S. (2)
Remark. For all the proofs, please refer to the appendix.
Eq. (2) states that the revenue gain of a flow f is evenly
shared among all n(f ,S) critical ISPs that deploy the new
architecture, and the Shapley value of an ISP is the total shared
revenue gains from different flows.
To illustrate, let us consider Fig. 4, which depicts a network
consisting of 4 ISPs and 6 flows where each flow passes
through three ISPs. Suppose the new architecture requires a
full-path participation and all four ISPs S={1, 2, 3, 4} upgrade
to the new architecture. Each flow has a revenue gain of $3,
i.e. R(f ,S)−R(f , ∅)=$3, ∀f∈F . According to (2), each ISP
shares $3/3=$1 in each flow. In total, ISP 1,3 and 4 gain $4
because they participate in 4 flows. One can see that ISP 2
shares a higher Shapley value of $6, because all 6 flows must
go through it. In other words, ISP 2 has a higher contribution
to the revenue gain of the new architecture. We like to point out
that the Shapley value is calculated ex-post and not known to
ISPs before deployment. Here, the Shapley values serve as the
benchmarking “true” benefits that the ISPs need to estimate,
while Shapley values may depart from realistic distributions.
B. The Architecture Deployment Game
Given the mechanism φ, the revenue gain share of each
ISP is determined by her action (i.e. to deploy the archi-
tecture or not) and the other ISPs’ actions. We formulate a
strategic-form game to characterize ISPs’ strategic behavior in
deciding whether to deploy the new architecture. We denote
C˜,
⋃
f∈F C(f) as the set of all critical ISPs. If an ISP is not
critical to any flow, she is dummy and will not get involved
in the deployment. Hence the players of interests are all the
critical ISPs C˜. Each ISP has two possible actions denoted
by A,{0, 1}, where 1 indicates that an ISP deploys the new
architecture and 0 indicates not. Let ai∈A denote the action
of ISP i∈C˜ and let a,(ai)i∈C˜ denote the action profile of
all critical ISPs. Given an action profile a, the corresponding
set of ISPs who deploy the new architecture is denoted as
Sa,{i|ai=1, i∈C˜}. The utility (or profit) ui(a) of an ISP is
the shared revenue gain minus its launching cost, i.e.
ui(a) ,
{
φi(Sa, v)− ci if ai = 1,
0 if ai = 0.
(3)
We denote this “architecture deployment game” by a tuple
G,〈C˜,A,u〉, where u,(u1, . . ., uN) is a vector of functions.
Game G is a “potential game”, where ISPs have a “potential
function” as the common objective during the deployment.
Lemma 1 ([12]). If φ satisfies (1), G is a potential game, i.e.,
ui(1,a−i)− ui(0,a−i) = Φ(1,a−i)− Φ(0,a−i), (4)
holds for all a−i, some Φ : A|C˜|→R, where a−i,(aj)j 6=i.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, 3, a potential function is:
Φ(a) =
∑
f∈F
∑n(f ,Sa)
m=1
V (f ,m)
m
−
∑
i∈C˜
aici, (5)
where V (f ,m),R({f},S)−R({f}, ∅) with n(f ,S) =m. We
call B(Sa),
∑
f∈F
∑n(f ,Sa)
m=1
V (f ,m)
m
total immediate benefits.
Remark. Eq. (4) states that any ISP’s profit to deploy, is the
same as the change of a unified potential function Φ(a). Thus,
an ISP will have a positive profit to deploy an architecture if
and only if her deployment increases the potential function.
This potential function Φ(a) has insightful physical mean-
ings. The term V (f ,m)/m is the revenue gain distributed to
the mth deployer in flow f immediately after her deployment.
The term
∑n(f ,Sa)
m=1 V (f ,m)/m is all such immediate benefits
that have been distributed to the past deployers in flow f .
Summing up on all flows, B(Sa) is the total benefits that have
been distributed to the ISPs Sa immediately when they deploy
the new architecture. Also,
∑
i∈C˜ aici is the total launching
cost of ISPs Sa. Therefore, the potential function Φ(a) is the
total immediate benefits minus the total launching cost.
IV. Analyzing ISPs’ Decisions via Equilibrium
An equilibrium represents a stabilized deployment status of
the critical ISPs of a new architecture. We first show that multi-
ple equilibria are possible in the architecture deployment game.
Then, we show the equilibrium that maximizes the potential
function will be reached when the ISPs face uncertainty.
A. Deployment Equilibria
Definition 3. An action profile a∗ ∈ A|C˜| is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game G, if for any i ∈ C˜, it holds that
ui(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai,a
∗
−i), ∀ai ∈ A.
Namely, under such equilibrium, each ISP can not increase
her utility by unilaterally deviating from her current action.
There exists a one-to-one mapping between equilibria of the
potential game and local maxima of the potential function[12].
Our game G may have multiple equilibria, as the poten-
tial function may have multiple local maxima. To illustrate,
consider Fig. 5. There are two flows and upgrading to the
new architecture will bring a benefit $12 for each flow. The
launching cost of each ISP is $3. There are 4 equilibria. The
first is illustrated in Fig. 5: (a) all ISPs do not deploy the new
architecture. This is because an ISP’s unilateral deviation to
deploy the new architecture will result in a loss of $3. Other
three equilibria are: (b) ISPs 1,2,3 deploy and ISPs 4,5 do not
deploy; (c) ISPs 2,4,5 deploy and ISPs 1,3 do not deploy;
(d) All ISPs deploy. In this example, we notice that “No-
deployment” (i.e., (a) all critical ISPs do not to deploy) can be
an equilibrium, while the successful deployment (i.e., (d) all
critical ISPs deploy) can also be an equilibrium. Among those
equilibria, there is a smallest (or largest) equilibrium with the
smallest (or largest) set of deployed ISPs in our game[13].
B. Which Equilibrium Will Be Reached?
We present two approaches to show eventually the equilib-
rium that maximizes the potential function will be reached.
(A) Logit response dynamics. We divide the time into slots,
i.e., t∈{1, . . . , T }. Let a(t) denote the action profile at time
slot t, and ISPs start with some initial action profile a(0). At
time slot t, we randomly pick one ISP, let’s say i ∈ C˜, to
make a decision based on other ISPs’ actions in the last time
slot, i.e. a(t−1)−i . This setting captures that ISPs sequentially
make decisions. More specifically, ISP i chooses each action
a
(t)
i ∈{0, 1} with a probability that is logit-weighted by utility:
Pr[a
(t)
i =a|a
(t−1)
−i ]=
eβtui(a,a
(t−1)
−i )
eβtui(0,a
(t−1)
−i )+eβtui(1,a
(t−1)
−i )
, a∈{0,1}.
This logit-weighted choice gives ISP i the optimal expected
utility, when the ISP has some uncertainty about his utility[14].
The parameter βt≥0 represents the degree of uncertainty. Low
βt means high uncertainty. When βt=0, the ISP is the most
uncertain and chooses to deploy with probability 0.5. When
βt→+∞, ISPs always choose the action with the highest
utility and the logit response reduces to the best response.
Since we allow ISPs to randomly choose to deploy or not, we
look into the probability to observe each deployment status.
Lemma 2 ([15]). Suppose βt = β, ∀t. For the game G, the
limiting distribution of the logit response dynamics is
P(a) = eβΦ(a)/
∑
a∈A|C˜|
eβΦ(a). (6)
Remark. The ISPs are more likely to stay in the deployment
status a with a higher potential value Φ(a). When β is suffi-
ciently large, the ISPs will eventually reach an equilibrium that
maximizes the potential function, i.e., argmax
a∈A|C˜| Φ(a).
(B) Iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Another
perspective is that ISPs make decisions under incomplete infor-
mation of the revenue gain. Before deploying, ISP i perceives a
benefit (1+εi) (R({f},Sa)−R({f}, ∅)) for the flow f , where
εi is a random variable with distribution Di that could be both
negative and positive values, and different ε′is are independent.
A negative (or positive) perception error εi means ISP i is
pessimistic (or optimistic) about the new architecture. We
define λi,(1+εi)∈R as the perception scaling factor. The
perceived benefit λi× (R({f},Sa)−R({f}, ∅)) is only known
to ISP i, while the distribution Di is known to all the ISPs.
We denote the strategy of an ISP i as a function from the
perception scaling factor to her action, i.e. si(λi) : R 7→{0, 1}.
To investigate in ISPs’ strategies, we use the solution
concept called “iterative strict dominance”. The basic idea
is that ISPs will not choose those actions which are known to
have worse profit in expectation. For example, an ISP will not
deploy IPv6 if she will lose money by deploying it.
Lemma 3 ([16]). Under Assumption 4, as the error distribu-
tions Di’s concentrate around zero, a unique strategy profile
survives from the iterative elimination of dominated strategy.
Moreover, ISPs’ actions (s∗i (1))i∈C˜∈ argmaxa∈AΦ(a).
Remark. This lemma states that under the iterative elimina-
tion of dominated strategies, the equilibrium that maximizes
the potential function will be reached as the perception errors
concentrate to zero. Some economic experiments were carried
out[17] that coincide with this equilibrium prediction.
To illustrate, let us go back to our first example in Fig. 1.
To start with, the ISPs know that when λi≤0.75, si(λi)=0, ∀i.
Namely, an ISP will not deploy if she perceives a total benefit
which is less than $9, or a benefit less than the launching
cost $3 for each ISP. For simplicity, suppose the distribution
of the perception error Di is Gaussian with mean 0 and
standard deviation 0.3 for i=1,2,3. Therefore, ISP 1 knows
λi
λ1
= (1+εi)(1+ε1) follows a ratio distribution of two independent
Gaussian variables. Let us now show how ISP 1 determines
her action for some λ1>0.75. ISP 1 knows that some other
ISP i∈{2,3} will perceive a scaling factor λi<0.75 with
probability P (λ1),Pr[λi=λ1
(1+εi)
(1+ε1)
<0.75]. It indicates that
some other ISP will not deploy with probability of at least
P (λ1). In fact, when λ1≤1.1, the expected utility of ISP 1 is
at most λ14(1−P (λ1))2−3≤0, so ISP 1 will not deploy. In
other words, s1(λ1)=0 if λ1≤1.1. Now, we know that ISP 1
will not deploy when the perceived revenue gain is less than
$12×1.1=$13.2. Similar reasoning applies to other ISPs. Even
without further inductions, the ISPs will choose not to deploy,
when the perceived benefit is close to the true value $12.
We have shown that the equilibrium which maximizes the
potential function will be reached if an ISP is uncertain about
benefit of new architecture and other ISPs’ decisions, from two
perspectives: (A) ISPs have dynamics by logit-weighted prob-
abilities; (B) ISPs iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.
Thus, we define this equilibrium as the “robust equilibrium”.
In this paper, we focus on the baseline case of risk-neutral
ISPs who maximize their expected utility. Our model can be
extended to discuss realistic “risk-averse” or “risk-seeking”
ISPs. For risk-averse ISPs who are unlikely to take the risk to
deploy, the new architectures becomes even less deployable.
V. Quantifying The Deployability
Given a new architecture, we now can use our model to
analyze ISPs’ actions on whether to deploy it or not.
A. General Analysis of Deployability
Definition 4. An architecture is successfully deployed if in the
“robust equilibrium”, all critical ISPs C˜ choose to deploy.
We next define a “profitable” architecture, whose benefit can
cover the total launching cost of all critical ISPs C˜.
Definition 5. An architecture is profitable if
v(C˜) ≥
∑
i∈C˜
ci. (7)
It is a simple necessary condition for successful deployment.
However, as we will see from a more refined necessary
condition, some profitable architecture may not be deployed.
Corollary 1. An architecture is successfully deployed only if
B(C˜) ≥
∑
i∈C˜
ci (8)
Condition (8) implies condition (7), but the reverse is not true.
Remark. This corollary comes from the requirement of
Φ((1, . . ., 1))≥0 for “all critical ISPs to deploy” to be a robust
equilibrium. It shows why a “profitable” architecture may not
be successfully deployed. To illustrate, consider a network of
three ISPs connected in a line topology. There is only one
flow and all three ISPs are critical. An architecture has a
total benefit which is twice of the total launching cost, i.e.
v(C˜)=2
∑
i∈C˜ ci. Then B(C˜)=
1
3v(C˜)<
∑
i∈C ci, which vio-
lates condition (8) for successful deployment. Interestingly,
even when the total benefit is twice of the total launching cost,
the new architecture still cannot be successfully deployed.
Corollary 2. If condition (8) holds, then in the robust equilib-
rium, a non-empty set of ISPs will deploy the new architecture.
This corollary states that condition (8) is sufficient to
guarantee that at least some of the ISPs (if not all) will deploy
the new architecture. Now, we could see that condition (8) is
a criteria to determine whether an architecture is deployable.
B. Impact of the Benefit-cost Ratio
Put v(C˜) as the common numerator, and (8) is equivalent to
v(C˜)∑
i∈C˜ ci
≥
v(C˜)
B(C˜)
, γ. (9)
Note that γ is defined as the ratio between the total
benefits v(C˜) and the “total immediate benefits” B(C˜). From
Corollary 1, we have γ≥1. Condition (9) says that the ratio be-
tween the total benefit and total launching cost v(C˜)/
∑
i∈C˜ ci
(“benefit-cost ratio” in short) should be higher than a “thresh-
old” γ, for a new architecture to be deployable. For a fixed
γ, if the benefit-cost ratio is higher, then the new architecture
will have a higher chance to be deployed. Hence, the designer
of an architecture should increase the benefit and reduce the
launching cost. As we will show, γ reflects the properties of
an architecture, and is related to the number of critical ISPs.
C. Impact of the Number of Critical ISPs
With no incremental deployment mechanisms, we have
γ =
v(C˜)
B(C˜)
=
∑
f∈F V (f , |C(f)|)∑
f∈F
V (f ,|C(f)|)
|C(f)|
. (10)
This equation is a consequence of v(C˜)=
∑
f∈F V (f , |C(f)|).
and B(C˜)=
∑
f∈F
V (f ,|C(f)|)
|C(f)| . In (10), γ is the harmonic mean
of the number of critical ISPs |C(f)| weighted by the maximum
benefit of each flow. The number of critical ISPs |C(f)|
represents the “degree of coordination” required by the new
architecture for flow f . Then the physical meaning of γ is the
“average degree of coordination” over the whole network.
On one hand, when an architecture requires a small number
of critical ISPs for each flow, γ is small. Then, we observe
from (9) that the architecture is easy to deploy if the benefit-
cost ratio surpasses this small number. On the other hand,
when a new architecture has a large number of critical ISPs
for each flow, it will be difficult to deploy, since the required
benefit-cost ratio is high. Let us see some real-world cases.
(1) Deployment difficulty of DiffServ: To have QoS guaran-
tees offered by DiffServ, all ISPs along the path are critical.
If any ISP along the path decides not to participate, the
QoS is no longer guaranteed. Using our model, we know
DiffServ requires a high benefit-cost ratio, and thus is difficult
to deploy. Hence, we see little adoption of DiffServ even if
QoS guarantee is urgently needed in the current Internet.
(2) The Internet flattening phenomenon: We are witnessing
a flattening Internet[18], [19]. This happens as large content
providers such as Google and Facebook use data centers near
the end-users. Hence, the routing paths become shorter and
many intermediate ISPs are bypassed. Interestingly, the flatten-
ing topology also brings about a more evolvable Internet. For
many new architectures which requires full-path participation,
the flattening Internet reduces the number of critical ISPs,
which makes the architectures more deployable. In fact, with
the prevalence of the data centers, many Internet flows are
going through the data centers of a single ISP (or content
provider). The intra-data center flows have only one critical
node, which indicates the highest deployability according to
our model. This explains why we see many innovations for
data centers proposed and deployed. We have shown that by
relying data centers, it will be easier for content providers to
deploy new protocols/architectures that would not be deployed
in the Internet. In this way, one can see that data centers help
content providers gain extra profit from the deployment of new
protocols/architectures.
D. Impact of Incremental Deployment
With incremental deployment mechanisms, we have
γ =
v(C˜)
B(C˜)
=
∑
f∈F V (f , |C(f)|)∑
f∈F
(∑|C(f)|
m=1
V (f ,m)
|C(f)|
) . (11)
The incremental mechanisms enable the new architecture
even when some of the critical ISPs do not deploy. The
benefit from incremental deployment is reflected by V (f ,m)
in (11) where m<|C(f)|. Compared to (10), it is clear that the
incremental benefits brought by these mechanisms reduce the
ratio γ, as the denominator in (11) becomes larger. This finding
highlights the importance of these incremental deployment
mechanisms for the final deployment of the new architectures.
(1) Incremental deployment mechanisms of IPv6: Different
incremental deployment mechanisms[20] enable IPv6 in the
current Internet by selecting ingress/egress points to bypass
the non-IPv6 areas. Despite many of these mechanisms, almost
all the IPv6 traffic are using native IPv6[1], which means
these mechanisms are mostly not used. Based on this fact, we
speculate that the ISPs do not have revenue gain by using these
incremental mechanisms, i.e. V (f ,m)=0 when m<|C(f)|. In
fact, if our speculation is wrong, many ISPs will use these
mechanisms to improve their revenue. According to our model,
the deployability of IPv6 will be as bad as if there were no
incremental deployment mechanisms, since ISPs’ incremental
benefits is zero. In a word, these mechanisms are unsuccessful.
(2) XIA: XIA[21] is a future Internet architecture proposed
recently that aims for an evolvable Internet. XIA has an intent-
fallback system. If routers cannot operate on the primary “in-
tent”, “fallbacks” will allow communicating parties to specify
alternative actions. However, even if one has the best-possible
incremental deployment mechanism, the incremental benefits
are limited due to the characteristics of the aimed functionality.
For example, it is almost impossible to have QoS guarantee
without the participation of any ISP along the path, no matter
which incremental deployment mechanism we use. Moreover,
our model predicts that XIA itself is very hard to be deployed.
This is because XIA is a network-layer protocol which has a
large number of critical ISPs. Also, how much benefit it could
bring to ISPs is not addressed.
VI. Competing Architectures
Our results thus far consider one architecture only. In this
section, we extend our model to study competing architec-
tures with similar functionalities. We will show that a more
“deployable” architecture will have a competitive advantage.
Deployment price of an architecture. ISPs charge cus-
tomers for using the new functionality (e.g. CDN[22], DDos
protection[23]). We consider a usage-based charging scheme.
When all critical ISPs deploy the architecture, the unit price
for the new functionality is p∈R+. Then, the revenue gain
of a flow f is R({f},C˜)−R({f},∅)=p×W (f), where W (f)
denotes the usage volume of the traffic flow f . In compliant
Fig. 6: Competing architectures
with our previous model, the unit price for flow f when a
subset S⊂C˜ of ISPs deploy is R({f},S)−R({f},∅)
R({f},C˜)−R({f},∅)
p. Then, the
total immediate benefit is B(C˜)=
(∑
f∈F p×W (f)
)
/γ.
We define the deployment price of an architecture as the
minimum unit price such that the condition (8) is satisfied,
i.e., pd,
γ
∑
i∈C ci∑
f∈F W (f)
. Namely, ISPs will deploy the architecture
when the unit price is above pd. Notice that the deployment
price of an architecture depends on “degree of coordination”
γ (about number of critical ISPs) and the total launching cost.
Multiple architectures under competition. Fig. 6 is an
extension of the example in Fig. 1, where two architectures
provide the same new functionality. Remember that architec-
ture B requires all the ISPs 1,2,3 to deploy, and the launching
cost for each ISP is $3. Architecture A, on the other hand,
requires only ISP 4 to deploy which is the ISP closest to the
end user, and has a launching cost $9 for that ISP. Note that the
total launching costs for these two architectures are both $9.
For simplicity, we again assume no incremental deployment
mechanism and we have one unit usage volume. What will be
a reasonable price for the new functionality? As we can see,
only if the price of the new functionality is higher than the
“deployment price” $27, the ISPs will deploy architecture B.
Meanwhile, architecture A will be deployed when the price
is higher than $9. We argue that a customer will not pay as
high as $27 if he could enjoy the same functionality with a
lower price $9. Then, the customer will choose architecture
A, and architecture B will not be deployed. We observe that
architecture B fails to be deployed because the price is brought
down by the more evolvable and competitive architecture A.
Suppose we have K new architectures providing the same
functionality, with deployment prices p(1)d ,· · ·, p
(K)
d respec-
tively. We consider a market where ISPs are highly compet-
itive so the customers can dictate the price. Here, we claim
without rigorous proof that the customers will set the price
to the lowest deployment price of these architectures, i.e.
mink{p
(k)
d }. This is reasonable because the customers will
not pay a higher price for a functionality if they could enjoy
the same functionality with a lower price. Consequently, other
architecutures with higher deployment prices will not be suc-
cessfully deployed. According to the deployment price, when
competitive architectures have comparable total launching
costs, the architecture with the lowest “degree of coordination”
γ will win. Let us consider the following two cases.
(1) IPv6 vs. NAT: IPv6 and NAT (Network Address Trans-
lation) have a similar functionality of “addressing hosts”. The
fact is that NAT is now supported by almost all Ethernet
without enough IP addresses, while IPv6 is still not deployed
in many countries. In short, NAT wins and this observation
could be explained by our model. IPv6 is a network-layer
protocol which requires full-path participation. Although there
are incremental deployment mechanisms, as we discussed
before, they are rarely enabled by many ISPs. NAT is an
application-layer solution which only requires end users who
want more addresses to deploy. The average AS path length
is around 4 [24]. Therefore, IPv6 requires higher “degree
of coordination” (around four times) compared to NAT. In
addition, we believe NAT has a much lower total launching
cost, because IPv6 wants to change every router in the Internet.
By definition, we know IPv6 has a higher (at least four times)
deployment price than NAT. That is why we see NAT wins.
In fact, ISPs seldom charge for IPv6 addresses, because the
price of “addressing hosts” is brought down by NAT.
(2) NDN vs. CDN: Content Delivery Network (CDN) caches
data spatially close to end-users to provide high availability
and better performance. Meanwhile, Named Data Networking
(NDN) [4] is a future Internet architecture that names data
instead of their locations. Their main functionalities are both
to provide scalable content delivery. CDNs operate at the
application-layer, so only the CDN owners need to deploy the
CDN infrastructures. NDN works directly at network layer[4].
Thus, the deployment of NDN requires full-path participation
(or high degree of coordination and it is around four). Suppose
NDN has a comparable total launching cost as CDN. Then we
could see that NDN has a higher deployment price (around
four times) than CDN, hence our models predict that the
current design of NDN cannot be deployed and CDN will
win out. Therefore, if NDN wants to be deployed faced with
CDN’s competition, one needs to have efficient incremental
deployment mechanisms. Guided by our analysis, a possible
incremental deployment mechanism for NDN is to “run NDN
over IP as edge caching”[25] at its early stage of deployment,
which provides incremental benefits even when few ISPs
deploy. This is possible since NDN is designed as a “universal
overlay”. This simple modification might make NDN evolvable
and competitive with CDN.
(3) Multipath TCP vs. Multipath QUIC: Multipath-TCP
(MPTCP)[26] is an extension of TCP, which enables inverse
multiplexing of resources, and thus increases TCP throughput.
MPTCP requires the middleboxed (e.g. firewall) in the Internet
to upgrade and not to interfere its packets[27]. Therefore,
the critical nodes for MPTCP include the senders, receivers,
and the ISPs with middleboxes. In contrast, Multipath-QUIC
(MPQUIC)[28] is an extension of QUIC[29] that achieves
similar functionalities of MPTCP. Because QUIC encrypts its
packets and headers, MPQUIC avoids the interference from
middleboxes. Then the critical nodes of MPQUIC only include
the senders and receivers. We argue that the total launching
cost of MPQUIC is not more than that of MPTCP. This is
because MPTCP and MPQUIC both require the senders and
receivers to upgrade their software, but MPTCP additionally
requires the middleboxes to be upgraded. Also, MPQUIC has
lower degree of coordination. Comparing the total launching
cost and the degree of coordination, our models predict that
MPQUIC will be deployed instead of MPTCP.
VII. Economics Mechanism Design
We observe that the difficulty of deployment comes from
the “requirement of coordination” for decentralized ISPs. We
then design a centralized mechanism to mitigate this difficulty.
Our mechanism has the following two steps.
1) Quoting: Each ISP i ∈ C˜ submits a quote qi∈R+ to the
coordinator. An ISP’s quote implies a contract that the
ISP would deploy the architecture once someone pays
more than the quote. Quoting itself is not charged.
2) ISP selection: In this step, the coordinator selects a set of
ISPs to deploy the architecture, and announces a reward
for each of them. For a selected ISP, the announced
reward should be at least as high as her quote. Then,
the selected ISPs deploy the new architecture, and the
coordinator gives ISPs the announced reward.
The cooridinator in the above mechanism can be anyone
such as the International organizations and the governments.
In the second step of the mechanism, the coordinator selects
the ISPs corresponding to the optimal solution S∗(q) of the
following problem (12), based on ISPs’ quotes q,(qi)i∈C˜ .
maximizeS⊆C˜ |S|,
subject to φi(S, v) ≥ qi, ∀i ∈ S. (12)
In addition, each selected ISP i∈S∗(q) gets a reward
φi(S∗(q), v) which is at least as high as her quote.
Properties of the design. The launching cost is an ISP’s
private information which the coordinator does not know. The
ISPs may intentionally quote lower to increase the chance
to be selected, or quote higher to ask for more reward. Our
mechanism enforces ISPs to quote exactly the launching cost.Theorem 3 (Truth-telling). In our ISP selection mechanism,
quoting qi=ci is a weakly dominant strategy for each ISP i∈C˜.
Theorem 4 (Efficiency). The unique selection S∗(c) yields
a maximal total revenue gain v(S∗(c)) of all ISPs and a
maximal utility ui(S∗(c), v) for each individual ISP i∈C˜.
Reducing the number of selected ISPs. Although the Internet
can evolve provided a proper coordinator, a major difficulty
is that the coordinator lacks the authority to manage a large
number of ISPs. To make our mechanism practical, we select a
small set of seeding ISPs called the “tipping set”[30], so that
the system will go to another equilibrium with more deployed
ISPs. After several rounds of tipping set selection, the ISPs
will reach the largest equilibrium. The details of our tipping
set selection algorithm are in G of the appendix.
From the historical data[1], [31] for the transition from
IPv4 to IPv6, we observe that actions of coordinators are
highly correlated to IPv6’s deployment. Before the first World
IPv6 Launch Day organized by Internet Society in 2012[32],
less than 1% of users accessed their services over IPv6[1].
In 2018, this number goes to nearly 25%[33]. As another
example, the Indian government decided a roadmap of IPv6’s
deployment in July 2010[34] when the adoption rate is less
than 0.5%. Now, over 30% of the traffics in India use IPv6[1].
In contrast, the government of China did not announce a plan
to put IPv6 into large-scale use until Nov. 2017[35]. Now, less
than 3% of traffics in China use IPv6[1]. We argue that the
different actions of Indian and Chinese governments determine
the different deployment statuses of IPv6 in the two countries.
VIII. Numerical Experiments
A. Experiment Settings
Datasets. The first dataset[36] was collected from a Euro-
pean education network GÉANT with 23 ASes (Autonomous
System). The data contains a network topology G=(N ,E)
and a traffic matrix T∈RN×N≥0 , where Tij records the traffic
volume from the source node i to the destination node j. There
are 477 flows of non-zero traffic volume in this dataset. The
second dataset[37] is the AS-level IPv4 topology collected by
Caida on Dec. 2017. The dataset contains a weighted graph
of 28,499 ASes G=(N ,E), where each edge (i,j)∈E can be
either a direct or an indirect link from i to j. This dataset
does not contain the traffic matrix data. Thus, we synthesize
a traffic matrix based on the Gravity method[38]. The idea
is that the traffic volume from node i to j is proportional to
the repulsive factor of the source node i denoted by T out(i),
and the attractive factor of the destination node j, denoted
by T in(j), i.e. Tij∝T out(i)×T in(j). We apply the Clauset-
Newman-Moore method[39] to extract the largest cluster in
the network. This cluster contains 2,774 nodes, and we take
T in(i) and T out(j) to be i.i.d. exponential random variables
with mean 1. From 2774×2774 possible flows, we randomly
select 74,424 (2%) as the flows with a positive demand of
traffic for the new architecture.
Parameter settings. An ISP corresponds to an AS that
has its own network policies, so we regard the ASes in
the datasets as the ISPs in our model. It is known that
GÉANT network uses IS-IS protocol[36] that implements the
Dijkstra shortest path algorithm. For flows with a positive
traffic, let F={f is a shortest path from s to t|s, t∈N , Ts,t>
0}. As we discussed in Sec. VI, a new functionality such
as CDN typically charges customers based on the usage.
Again, we assume that the benefit of a flow is propor-
tional to the usage volume and the unit price is p, i.e.,
R({f}, C˜)−R({f}, ∅)=p×W (f). Given a traffic matrix T, the
usage volume of a flow f=(s, . . ., t) is set as W (f) = Ts,t.
The launching cost of an ISP depends on the workload of the
ISP. Hence, we assume that the launching cost of an ISP i is
proportional to the total amount of traffic through this ISP, i.e.
ci=C×
∑
f∈F 1{i∈f}W (f), where C is the launching cost for
a unit amount of traffic. For an architecture deployment game
〈C˜,A,u〉, as we scale p and C linearly at the same rate, the
utility function u scales linearly as well. This means that the
Nash equilibria and the robust equilibrium will not be changed.
Without loss of generality, we set C=1, and see the impact of
p. Now, the parameter p also represents p/C.
B. Quantifying the Deployability
Benefit-cost ratio. The unit price p determines the benefit-cost
ratio of the new architecture. For GÉANT network, the total
benefit will be more than the total launching cost when p>3.3.
Fig. 7 shows the impact of p on the deployability without
any incremental deployment mechanism. When p≤4, there is
only one equilibrium that is “no ISP will deploy”, because
the benefit of the new architecture is not enough to cover
ISPs’ launching cost. When p≥5, the largest equilibrium (with
the largest set of deployers) is that “all the 23 ISPs deploy”.
However, in the robust equilibrium, no more than one ISP will
deploy until p≥10. This is because the largest equilibrium
will not have a positive potential function unless p≥9.54.
For the IPv4 network with 2,774 ISPs, computing the robust
equilibrium is intractable, so in Fig. 8, Fig. 10, and Fig. 12,
we choose one of the smallest/largest equilibria with a higher
potential function which is the one that is possible to be the
robust equilibrium. For the IPv4 network, a new architecture
will be profitable when p≥4.78. But only when p≥21.88,
the condition (9) for successful deployment can be satisfied.
Hence, as seen from Fig. 8, only when p≥25, “all ISPs to
deploy” is the one that is possible to be a robust equilibrium.
Similar phenomena are observed in both networks.
Incremental deployment mechanisms. We set the incremen-
tal benefit for f as R({f},S)−R({f},∅)=
(
n(f ,S)
|C(f)|
)α
pW (f),
when a set S⊆C˜ of ISPs deploy. The parameter α≥1 represents
performances of incremental deployment mechanisms, where a
smaller α indicates better performances. When α=+∞, there
is no incremental benefit. In this case, as depicted in Fig. 9, the
new architecture will not be deployed in the GÉANT network
until p≥10. In contrast, when α=1, the architecture will be
immediately deployed by 7 ISPs when p=3 and will be fully
deployed by all ISPs when p≥5. As α decreases, the new
architecture gets deployed by more ISPs for a fixed p, in help
of better incremental mechanisms. As seen in Fig. 10, better
incremental mechanisms also improve the deployability of new
architectures in the IPv4 network.
Internet flattening phenomenon. To see the impact of a
flattening Internet, we shrink the paths of the original flows
to have a maximum length of M . For a original flow
(s,v1,. . .,vL,t) with a path length L+2>M , the flattened flow
will be (s,vL−M+3,. . .,vL,t) that contains s, t and M−2 ISPs
which are nearest the destination t. This setting emulates that
the sender uses data centers near the receiver. For GÉANT,
Fig. 11 shows that when the maximum path length is shortened
to M=2 (i.e. only the sender & receiver are in the flow),
more than 10 ISPs will deploy when p≥3.5. Meanwhile, in the
original network, ISPs will deploy the new architecture only
when p≥10. Generally, the new architecture will be deployed
by more ISPs in a more flattened network for a fixed p, as we
can also see in Fig. 12 for the IPv4 network. One may observe
that when content providers use data centers which are close
to end users, they can pay a lower unit price p to the ISPs so
to enjoy the deployed new architectures/technologies.
Lessons learned. A profitable new architecture may not be
deployed. Also, an architecture with a higher benefit-cost ratio
has higher deployability. The enhancement of incremental de-
ployment mechanisms and the flattening Internet both improve
the deployability of the new architectures.
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C. Benefits of Economics Mechanisms
How the centralized coordinator can select the small “tip-
ping set” of ISPs in the GÉANT network is shown in Fig. 13.
At each time step t=1, 2, · · ·, the coordinator selects some
ISPs, where we see a vertical increment for the number of
deployers. Between time steps t & t+1, some ISPs will deploy
if they have higher utilities, where we see an increasing slope.
For a small p=3, the economics mechanism cannot help and
“all ISPs do not deploy” is the only equilibrium. When p=7,
originally the new architecture cannot be successfully deployed
as shown in Fig. 7. With the help of economics mechanism,
by selecting 15 ISPs as the tipping set, all ISPs will finally
deploy. When p further increases to 11, the coordinator only
needs to select 7,2,4 ISPs in three steps respectively.
For the IPv4 network, when p=5, no ISP will deploy even
with the existence of the coordinator. When p=10 and 20,
after the coordinator selects 1,970 and 1,350 tipping ISPs re-
spectively, all ISPs will finally deploy. Note that 1,350<1,970.
Lessons learned. As the benefit-cost ratio of architectures
increases, the coordinator selects a smaller number of ISPs.
D. Logit-response Dynamics of ISPs
We simulate ISPs’ behaviors by the logit-response dynamics
defined in Sec. IV-B, where we randomly initiate an ISP to
deploy with probability 0.5. For the GÉANT network, we set
βt=8×10−5/t, and take the average of 200 runs. As shown in
Fig. 14, the number of deployed ISPs is close to the predictions
of the robust equilibrium. When T=50, each ISP on the
average makes two decisions, and the outcome of dynamics is
very close to the robust equilibrium. As we increase T=500,
the outcome becomes closer to the robust equilibrium. Similar
results are observed for the IPv4 network in Fig. 15. The logit-
response dynamics lead to the “robust” equilibrium, as if ISPs
are maximizing some potential function in the deployment.
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IX. Related Works
Designing future Internet architecture has been on the
agenda since the early ages of the Internet[40]. A variety
of future architectures were proposed[2], [4], [6], [5] to
improve IPv4. Unfortunately, most of these proposals fail to
deploy at scale. To make the Internet architectures evolvable,
incremental deployment mechanisms are developed to enable
universal access of IPv6[41], [42], [20]. While an evolvable
new architecture should be compatible with old architectures,
our work shows via economic models that an evolvable ar-
chitecture should also provide incremental “benefits” to ISPs.
Internet flattening phenomenon was studied in [18], [19], and
our work formalizes their observations. A recent work [43]
studied the incremental deployment of routing protocols, and
suggested a coordinated adoption of a large number of ISPs.
Economics issues with the future Internet architectures have
also been noticed. Wolf et al. developed ChoiceNet [44] to
provide an economics plane to the Internet and a clear eco-
nomics incentive for ISPs. Our work also points out that a new
architecture may not be deployed even if it could be profitable
for all ISPs. Along this direction, Ratnasamy et al.[45] has a
similar “chicken-and-egg” argument. Our economics analysis
strengthens these arguments and quantitatively analyze the dif-
ficulty of coordination among decentralized ISPs. Some works
studied the adoptability of BGP security protocols[46][47].
They conducted simulations based on assumptions of ISPs’
behaviors, while we provide game-theoretic analysis to reveal
key factors for the deployability, e.g. the coordination of ISPs.
How to select some seeding ISPs to stimulate the deployment
was studied[48], but the incentives for the seeding ISPs remain
a problem. Our economic mechanism considers the launching
cost of the ISPs and requires the coordinator to invest nothing.
The “coordination failure” phenomenon was also studied
in economics[49]. Monderer et al.[12] found that the equilib-
rium that maximizes a potential function accurately predicts
Huyck’s experiments[50]. Then Morris et al.[51] give reasons
via the “global game”, which is used in our analysis.
X. Conclusion
This paper studies the deployability & evolvability of new
architectures/protocols from an economic perspective. Our
economic models show that: (1) Due to coordination difficulty,
being profitable is not sufficient to guarantee a new architecture
to be widely deployed; (2) A superior architecture may lose to
another competing architecture which requires less coordina-
tion. Our model explains why IPv4 is hard to be replaced, why
IPv6, DiffServ, CDN have different deployment difficulties,
and why we observe the “Internet flattening phenomenon”. Our
model also quantify the importance of incremental deployment
mechanisms for the deployment of new Internet architectures.
For architectures like DiffServ with which incremental deploy-
ment mechanisms are not available, people may consider a
centralized mechanism to help the deployment. The designers
of new architectures like NDN and XIA can also use our model
to evaluate and improve the deployability of their design. Our
model predicts that the current design of NDN and XIA are
difficult to deploy, and MPQUIC will win over MPTCP.
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Appendix
A. Allowing ISPs to Divide Themselves into Sub-networks
In Sec. II-B, we mentioned that an ISP can divide its
network into multiple sub-networks and each sub-network
independently decides whether to deploy. In this part, we will
discuss how the ISPs will divide the sub-networks and how the
deployability might change when an ISP is allowed to divide
itself into smaller parts.
First, we claim that an ISP will not divide the sub-network
used for a flow into smaller parts. In order words, the sub-
network used for some flow is an “atom” in the division that
cannot be further divided. This is because that, if the ISP
only upgrades some devices used for a flow but does not
upgrade the others, then the new architecture still cannot be
used for this flow. It is better for the ISP not to upgrade any
devices for a flow than to only upgrade some devices for a
flow. Therefore, for the sub-network needed for a flow, an ISP
will either upgrade all of it or upgrade none of it.
Now, we will show that whether an ISP is allowed to
divide itself into independent sub-networks does not affect the
deployability of an architecture. Given that the sub-network for
a certain flow cannot further be divided, one can see that the
number of critical nodes of a flow remains the same whether an
ISP is divided into multiple sub-networks. This is illustrated
in Fig. 16. Then, from (5), one can see that the immediate
benefits B(C˜) is not changed whether the ISPs are divided
into sub-networks. Therefore, according to the deployment
condition (8) that is not changed, whether an architecture could
be successfully deployed do not rely on whether ISPs divide
themselves into independent sub-networks.
In conclusion, allowing ISPs to divide themselves into sub-
networks does not affect our results on the deployability
of an architecture, when these sub-networks make decisions
independently. We also need to point out that the above
argument only apply to the cases where the divided sub-
networks make independent decision on whether to deploy.
It may be a different story if the sub-networks of an ISP make
decisions dependently.
B. Competition Between The New & Old Architectures
In Sec. II-B, our Assumption 2 ignores the reduction of
old architecture’s revenue faced with the new architecture’s
competition. In this part, we extend our model to discuss the
competition between the new and the old architecture.
In the main paper, we only consider the improvement of
revenue introduced by the new architecture. Moreover, the
revenue from a flow f only depends on its critical ISPs C(f),
i.e. R({f},S) = R({f},S ∩ C(f)). In reality, when the new
architecture is deployed by some ISPs, the revenue from the
existing old architecture may be reduced. For example, when
IPv6 is deployed in some regions, the IPv4-alone services
becomes less attractive and customers will pay less for the
old IPv4 services.
In this section, we extend our framework to consider this
competition between the old and the new architecture. The
competition between the old and the new architecture was
considered an important reason why the new architectures
are difficult to deploy. A concern called “self-cannibalism”
says that the leading ISPs are reluctant to deploy the new
architecture because the successful deployment of the new
architecture may destroy their existing profit from the old ar-
chitecture. Also, there is another opinion[47] that the pressure
under competition also drives the deployment of ISPs, since an
ISP will lose money if he does not deploy but others deploy.
The revenue reduction of the old architecture depends on
the deployment status of the new architecture. Let
I(f) , 1[C(f) ⊆ Sa]
indicate whether a flow f is enabled with the new architecture.
The total weight (capacity) of flows enabled with the new
architecture is w˜ =
∑
f
I(f)W (f). The damage on the revenue
of flow f increases as more flows are enabled with the new
functionality. In particular, we assume the damage is linear
with respect to the total weight (capacity) of enabled flows.
Each participating ISP will lose σw˜W (f) from a flow f if
I(f) = 0 and i ∈ f , where σ is a constant representing
the strength of reduction. The revenue of a flow equipped
with the new architecture (i.e. I(f)=1) will not be altered,
and R({f},S)=R({f},S ∩ C(f)) when I(f)=1. After this
extension of our model, the utility of an ISP i is
u′i(a) ,

φi(Sa, v)− ci − σw˜
∑
f ,i∈f
W (f)(1−I(f)) if ai=1,
−σw˜
∑
f ,i∈f
W (f)(1−I(f)) if ai=0.
(13)
Denote the architecture deployement game under the ex-
tended model as G′ = (C˜,A,u′). We call this game G′ “the
extended game”. Note that when σ = 0, the game reduces to
our “baseline game” G. In (13), we notice that an ISP’s loss
from a flow from the old architecture is determined by the
capacity of all the flows equipped with the new architecture,
and his own weight of traffic using the old architecture.
The increment of utility by deploying an architecture for an
ISP comes from two parts (1) the revenue gain distribution
from the new architecture (2) the change of loss for the old
architecture. For a large ISP, if he deploy at the early stage,
the deployment will cause huge loss in the old architecture
because he raises up the loss rate w˜ and still have many old-
architecture flows. A small ISP may not have such problem.
One can show that our game G′ is a supermodular game,
since the benefit from deploying a new architecture increases
as more other ISP have deployed the new architecture. How-
ever, the extended game may not be a potential game. But
we are possible to compare its outcome with the outcome of
another potential game for which we can apply our analytical
framework. Next, we will construct this game in comparison.
Let us consider the following potential function Φ˜ in (14)
and the corresponding potential game. Here, we denote w˜i ,∑
f ,i∈f W (f)I(f) as the total weight of flows enabled with the
new architecture that ISP i participate in.
Φ˜(a) =
∑
f∈F
∑n(f ,Sa)
m=1
V (f ,m)
m
−
∑
i∈C˜
aici
+
1
2
w˜2 +
1
2
∑
i
w˜2i −
∑
i
w˜i ∑
f ,i∈f
W (f)
 . (14)
There is a corresponding potential game GΦ˜ that has the
potential function Φ˜ [12]. In the following, we will compare
the two games GΦ˜ (called the comparison game) and G
′ (the
extended game). We have the following fact.
Lemma 4. The utility increment by switching to deploy in the
extended game G′ is higher than that in the game GΦ˜, i.e.
u′i(1,a−i)− u
′
i(0,a−i) ≥ Φ˜(1,a−i)− Φ˜(0,a−i), (15)
holds for all a−i, and any i ∈ C˜.
Proof. Just do subtraction, and notice that w˜i <
∑
f ,i∈f W (f)
for any i.
Remark. This lemma says: in the extended game G′, the ISPs
have higher incentives to deploy the architecture compared to
a comparison game GΦ˜. Intuitively, the outcome of the game
GΦ˜ serves as a comparison, and there will be a larger-scale
deployment in the our extended game G′. In fact, the game
G′ may have multiple equilibria, e.g. when σ is small. We are
still interested in the equilibria when ISPs face uncertainty.
(A) Logit response dynamics. Let’s compare the stochastic
process of how ISPs play in the two games G′ and GΦ˜.
Suppose the random sequence of picked ISPs {it}∞t=1 is the
same for the two games. By the logit-weighted choice rule for
ISPs in Sec. IV-B and (15), we know that every picked ISP
it has a higher probability to deploy in the extended game G′
(i.e. setting ait = 1). Moreover, in a supermodular game, the
more ISPs deploy the new architecture, the higher incentive
for other ISPs to deploy. The rich-get-richer property further
enhance that an picked ISP it will have a higher probability to
deploy in the extended game G′ than that in the comparison
game GΦ˜. Therefore, in the limiting distribution, there will
be more ISPs deploying the new architecture in our extended
game G′ than that in the comparison game GΦ˜, in expectation.
(B) Iterative elimination of dominated strategies. There
exists a unique equilibrium that survives from iterative elimi-
nation of dominated strategies in our extended game G′ [16],
since it is supermodular. In the iterative elimination process,
if the action ai = 1 remains uneliminated in the comparison
game GΦ˜, it will not be eliminated in the extended game
G′ (ISPs has higher incentive to deploy) following the same
process. Therefore, in the survived “robust equilibrium”, there
will be at least as many ISPs deploying the new architecture
in our extended game G′ as that in the comparison game GΦ˜.
By our analysis in (A) and (B), we know the number of
ISPs who deploy the architecture in our extended game G′
will not be less than that in the comparison game GΦ˜, when
ISPs face uncertainty. Further, we are going to show that the
comparison game GΦ˜ usually indicates better deployability
than our baseline game G. Therefore, the deployability of the
extended game G′ would be even better.
Let’s look at the potential function, we have Φ˜(0)=0, and
Φ˜(1) = Φ(1) +
1
2
σ
(∑
f
W (f))2 −
∑
i
(
∑
f ,i∈f
W (f))2
 .
(16)
Recall that Φ is the potential function of the baseline game G.
Let us see how ISPs’ weights (capacity) of flows affects the
deployment. Note that
∑
f ,i∈f W (f) is total weight (capacity)
for ISP i. In (16), the term (
∑
f
W (f))2 is a constant. For the
remaining term
∑
i(
∑
f ,i∈f W (f))
2, we have the inequality:∑
i
(
∑
f ,i∈f
W (f))2 ≥
1
N
(
∑
f
|f |W (f))2, (17)
where |f | is the number of ISPs involved in the flow f .
The equality holds in (17) if and only if
∑
f ,i∈f W (f) =
1
N
∑
f
|f |W (f), i.e. the capacities of each ISPs are the same.
In other words, when different ISPs have comparable ca-
pacities (weights) in the network, the potential function is
maximized. In this case, we have Φ˜(1) ≥ Φ(1) provided
that maxf∈F{|f |}2 ≤ N (i.e. the number of ISPs is large).
In fact, one can see that (
∑
f
W (f))2 is much more than
1
N
(
∑
f
|f |W (f))2 when N is large. From (16), we know
that hopefully the potential function Φ˜(1) > Φ(1). It means
the “successful deployment” is more probable to happen in
the comparison game GΦ˜ than that in the baseline game G
according to our analysis in Sec. V. Then, the “successful
deployment” is even more likely in the extended game G′.
Conclusion. From the above analysis, we know that the new
architecture becomes more deployable if it competes with the
old architecture, when the ISPs have comparable capacities (or,
Φ˜(1) > Φ(1)). Next, we will show that the condition Φ˜(1) >
Φ(1) holds for the real-world traffic statistics of GÉANT.
Taking the parameters of the GÉANT network in
Sec. VIII, we have (
∑
f
W (f))2 = 12.6 × 1013 and∑
i(
∑
f ,i∈f W (f))
2=9.6×1013. We can see that Φ˜(1)>Φ(1)
holds for the GÉANT network. Thus, it is more likely to
see “successful deployment” if the deployment of a new
architecture reduce the revenue from the old architecture, for
the GÉANT network. On the other hand, we also point out
that if the capacities of different ISPs are highly skewed,
Φ˜(1) > Φ(1) may not hold, and the new architecture might
be less deployable in our extended game with the competition.
It is not surprising to see that the competition between the
old and new architecture helps the deployment. The reason is
that if the ISPs has a equally small market share, the one who
deploy the new architecture gains a competitive advantage.
The authors in [47] hold a similar opinion that competition
drives deployment. The above analysis suggested that: although
the revenue reduction introduced by the competition of new
architecture may cause the “self-cannibalism” of existing ISPs,
it does not hurt ISPs’ willingness to deploy the new architec-
ture because they also want to gain competitive advantages,
provided that the ISPs have comparable capacities.
C. The Change of Routing Path
In Sec. II-B, our Assumption 2 ignores the possible change
of routing path. In this part, we condier the change of routing
path, and show that the ISPs are more willing to deploy the
architecture if they are allowed to change the routing path.
For a flow f , denote the flow after the possible change of
routing path as f ′′. Also, denote the utility of ISP i after
the change of routing path as u′′i (a). Here, we make a mild
assumption that every ISP who deploys the architecture will
always be kept in the routing path. Formally, if ai = 1 and
i ∈ f , then i ∈ f ′′. This is reasonable, because the change
of routing path is to bypass the ISPs who do not deploy the
new architecture in order to use the new architecture for a
flow. Those ISPs that have deployed the architecture will not
be bypassed.
Then, we claim that u′′i (1,a−i)−u
′′
i (0,a−i) > ui(1,a−i)−
ui(0,a−i). In other words, the incentive for an ISP to deploy
increases when we consider the change of routing path.
Let us explain why. If we consider the change of routing
path, R({f},S)>R({f}, ∅) when n(f ,S)<|C(f)|. First, after
the deployment of ISP i, the improvement of total revenue
v′′(S ∪ {i})− v′′(T ) > v(S ∪ {i})− v(T ) when we consider
the change of routing path, because more flows will be enabled
with the new architecture by changing the routing paths.
Then, ISP i’s distribution of revenue gain increases when we
consider the change of routing path, i.e. φ′′i (S, v) > φi(S, v)
according to (1). Thus ISP i’s utility after the deployment
u′′i (1,a−i) = φ
′′
i (S, v) − ci > ui(1,a−i). Also, we have
u′′i (0,a−i) ≤ 0 = ui(0,a−i). This is because an ISP that does
not deploy the architecture will be bypassed which reduces
its revenue, when we consider the change of routing path. In
conclusion, u′′i (1,a−i)−u
′′
i (0,a−i) > ui(1,a−i)−ui(0,a−i)
and the incentive for an ISP to deploy increases if we consider
the change of routing path.
As a consequence, if an ISP is willing to deploy the new
architecture in the baseline model (without the change of
routing path), then this ISP is still willing to deploy if we
consider the change of routing paths. In other words, an ISP
is more willing to deploy a new architecture when the change
of routes is considered. From the above discussion, one can
see that the change of route is not a reason to explain why
deploying a new architecture is difficult.
D. Closed-form of Shapley value and the potential function
First, we show the closed-form of the Shapley value.
Fig. 16: Decoupled ISPs
Proof of Theorem 1. We define the revenue gain function
vf (S) = R({f},S) − R({f}, ∅) for the flow f . Note that
v(S) =
∑
f∈F vf (S). Consider the Shapley value regarding to
vf . According to Property 3, any i 6∈C(f) is dummy for the flow
f and φi(S, vf )=0 for i 6∈C(f). Furthermore, for i, j ∈ S∩C(f),
we have vf (T ∪ {i}) = vf (T ∪ {j}) for all T ⊆ S \ {i, j}
because of Assumption 3. Therefore, by Property 2, we have
φi(S, vf ) = φj(S, vf ) for any i, j ∈ C(f)∩S, which means that
two critical ISPs for a flow f should share the same revenue
gain if they deploy the new architecture. Now, by Property
1, we know
∑
i∈S φi(S, vf ) = vf (S), so each critical ISP
i ∈ C(f) that deploys the new architecture has an equal share
φi(S, vf ) = vf (S)/n(f ,S). According to Property 4,
φi(S, v) = φi(S,
∑
f∈F
vf ) =
∑
f∈F
φi(S, vf )
=
∑
f∈F
1{i∈C(f)}
vf (S)
n(f ,S)
=
∑
f∈F
1{i∈C(f)}
R({f},S)−R({f}, ∅)
n(f ,S)
.
The above equation we have proved is exactly Eq. (2).
To better understand the physical meaning of the Shapley
value, we illustrate in Fig. 16 where the ISPs in the example
of Fig. 4 are decoupled. We could see that the flow (1, 2, 3)
from ISP 1 to ISP 3 passes three decoupled ISPs. These three
decoupled ISPs have symmetric contributions to the revenue
gain, because they are all critical to the functionality of the
new architecture. Therefore, for fairness, each of the three ISPs
should receive the same share of revenue gain from the flow.
Moreover, the share of revenue gain of an ISP comes from all
such decoupled ISPs. Summing up the received revenue gain
from different decoupled ISPs, an ISP will have our closed-
formed Shapley value.
Then, we show the closed-form of potential function Φ.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since ui(0,a−i) = 0, we have
ui(1,a−i)−ui(0,a−i)=
∑
f∈F
1{i∈C(f)}
V
(
f , n(f ,Sa−i)+1
)
n(f ,Sa−i)+1
−ci.
Now, consider Φ(1,a−i)− Φ(0,a−i). First,
Φ(1,a−i) =
∑
f∈F
∑n(f ,Sa−i )+1{i∈C(f)}
m=1
V (f ,m)
m
−
∑
j 6=i
ajcj − ci
Second,
Φ(0,a−i) =
∑
f∈F
∑n(f ,Sa−i )
m=1
V (f ,m)
m
−
∑
j 6=i
ajcj
Therefore, we have
Φ(1, a−i)−Φ(0, a−i)=
∑
f∈F
1{i∈C(f)}
V
(
f , n(f ,Sa−i)+1
)
n(f ,Sa−i)+1
−ci.
We could see that ui(1,a−i) − ui(0,a−i) = Φ(1,a−i) −
Φ(0,a−i) for any a−i, which satisfies the definition of a
potential game in Eq. (4). Hence, we have proved that a
function Φ in the form of Eq. (5) is a valid potential function
and our game G is a potential game by definition.
E. Architecture Deployment Game
In this section, we will show that our game G is a super-
modular game. We will also guide the readers to the theory
of the “global game” which predicts the robust equilibrium.
Furthermore, we will prove our corollaries about the game.
We next show that under the complementarity effect, an ISP
will have more incentive to deploy the new architecture if more
ISPs have already deployed it, as follows:
Theorem 5. Suppose φ satisfies (1), and Assumption 4 holds,
then the game G is a supermodular game, i.e., for all i ∈ C˜,
ui(1,a
′
−i)− ui(0,a
′
−i) ≥ ui(1,a−i)− ui(0,a−i),
whenever a′−i ≥ a−i holds component-wisely.
Proof of Theorem 5. In section 5.2 of [52], it is showed that
for some i ∈ S ⊆ T , we have
φi(S, v) ≤ φi(T , v). (18)
This is because the marginal improvement of ISPs’ total
revenue by adding ISP i will be higher as more other ISPs
have already participate in the deployment. Note that
ui(1,a
′
−i) = φi(Sa′−i∪{i}, v)− ci,
ui(1,a−i) = φi(Sa−i∪{i}, v)− ci,
ui(0,a
′
−i) = 0, ui(0,a−i) = 0. (19)
Since a−i ≤ a′−i, we have Sa−i∪{i} ⊆ Sa′−i∪{i}. Thus,
φi(Sa−i∪{i}, v) ≤ φi(Sa′−i∪{i}, v).
Combined with (19), we have
ui(1,a
′
−i)−ui(0,a
′
−i)≥ui(1,a−i)−ui(0,a−i),
which concludes our proof.
We have a claim in Sec. IV-B that the “robust equilibrium”
can be located in polynomial time. This is because the set
function Φ′ defined by Φ′(Sa),Φ(a) is a supermodular
function as we will show, and the global maximizer of a
supermodular function can be found in strongly polynomial
time[53].
Proof of the supermodularity of Φ′(·). Because a super-
modular game has increasing differences of ISPs’ actions, i.e.
ui(a
′
i,a
′
−i)− ui(ai,a
′
−i) ≥ ui(a
′
i,a−i)− ui(ai,a−i),
whenever a′i ≥ ai and a
′
−i ≥ a−i component-wisely. In a
potential game, it also means that
Φ(a′i,a
′
−i)− Φ(ai,a
′
−i) ≥ Φ(a
′
i,a−i)− Φ(ai,a−i) (20)
Let S1,Sa−i and S2,Sa′−i which can be any sets S1⊆S2.
By (20), using the set function Φ′, we have Φ′(S2 ∪ {i}) −
Φ′(S2)≥Φ′(S1∪{i})−Φ′(S1). Because S1 and S2 can be any
sets, we proved that Φ′ is a supermodular function[53].
Lemma 5 ([13]). The set of equilibria has a smallest element
a
∗, and a largest element a∗, i.e. a∗ ≤ a∗ ≤ a∗ component-
wisely (or Sa∗⊆Sa∗⊆Sa∗), for any other equilibrium a∗.
Lemma 5 states that whichever equilibrium is reached, a set
Sa∗ of ISPs will deploy, while ISPs in (C˜\Sa∗) will not deploy.
Corollary 3. (1) If v({i})≤ci, ∀i, then (0, . . ., 0) is an equilib-
rium. (2) If φi(C˜, v)≥ci, ∀i, then (1, . . . , 1) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 3. It is easy to see that a∗ = (0, . . . , 0) is
a pure Nash equilibrium, if v({i}) ≤ ci, ∀i ∈ C˜. For any i∈C˜,
we have ui(1,0−i)=v({i})−ci≤0=ui(0,0−i). By Definition
3, a∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there is
no smaller equilibrium than (0, . . . , 0). Similarly, we can see
that the action profile a∗ = (1, . . . , 1) is also a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, if φi(C˜, v) ≥ ci, ∀i ∈ C˜. This is because for
any i∈C˜, ui(1,1−i)=φi(C˜, v)−ci≥0=ui(0,1−i). Also, there
is no larger equilibrium than (1, . . . , 1).
Remarks on Lemma 3. This Theorem is a result of Frankel,
Morris et al. in the paper “Equilibrium Selection in Global
Games with Strategic Complementarities”[16]. We apply the
“global game” framework. The idea of the “global game”
is that the ISPs have incomplete information and ISPs have
a small perception error on the payoff, just as we stated
in Sec. IV-B (B). In Theorem 1 of that paper, they show
the strategic profile (s∗i (·))i∈C˜ of the players is unique as
the error distributions Di’s concentrate around zero, if our
original game without perception error is a supermodular
game. Theorem 4 in that paper states that the unique strategy
profile will be the “Local Potential maximizer” (in our case,
the maximizer of the potential function Φ(·) is their “LP-
maximizer”) as the perception error becomes 0, i.e. εi = 0, or
λi = 1.
Note that the quasi-concavity in their assumption could be
extended to discrete cases, and our case with only two actions
automatically satisfies the quasi-concavity since it is indeed
linear. Moreover, we have a slightly different way to model the
perception error, although both ways have the same physical
interpretation that is an ISP will possibly perceive a higher or
lower payoff compared to its truth value. The key part is how
an ISP (say i) can reason the probability for some other ISP
(say j) to deploy or not. In their model, the perception error
is additive, therefore the ISP j’s perceived signal xj follows
a posterior distribution xi+(fj−fi) where fi and fj are the
distributions of εi and εj . In our model, ISP j’s perceived
signal λj follows a ratio distribution of the random variable
xi
1+εj
1+εi
= xi+
εj−εi
1+εi
xi. Their proof only requires that the
perception deviation from j to i that is (fj−fi) to have both
positive and negative support with no restriction on the specific
distribution fi, fj . In fact, our perception deviation
εj−εi
1+εi
xi
does have support on both positive and negative values and
their proofs still apply.
Proof of Corollary 1. If all critical ISPs C˜ deploy the new
architecture in the robust equilibrium, then Φ((1, . . . , 1))
should be the maximum value of the potential function Φ(·).
Therefore, at least Φ((1, . . . , 1)) ≥ Φ((0, . . . , 0)) = 0. It
directly leads to Condition (8).
Next, we show B(C˜) ≤ v(C˜). We consider a special
sequence of deployers C˜ = {1, 2, . . . , |C˜|}. Namely, the first
deployer is ISP 1, the second deployer is ISP 2, and so on.
The total immediate benefits is now
B(C˜) = φ1({1}, v) + φ2({1, 2}, v) + . . .+ φ|C˜|(C˜, v). (21)
Note that the total immediate benefits do not depend on the
specific sequence of deployers. Also,
v(C˜) = φ1(C˜, v) + φ2(C˜, v) + . . .+ φ|C˜|(C˜, v). (22)
We could see that {i : i≤m} ⊆ C˜ when m≤|C˜|. Therefore, ac-
cording to (18), φm({i : i≤m}, v) ≤ φm(C˜, v) for anym≤|C˜|.
Immediately, from (21) and (22), we know B(C˜) ≤ v(C˜).
Proof of Corollary 2. We discuss by two cases. The first case
is that B(C˜) >
∑
i∈C˜ ci. In this case we have
Φ((1, . . ., 1)) > Φ((0, . . . , 0)) = 0.
Then, for some maximizer a∗∈ argmaxa Φ(a), Φ(a∗)>0.
Moreover, a∗ 6=0. Therefore, in the robust equilibrium a∗,
there exist a non-empty set of ISPs to deploy the new ar-
chitecture.
The second case is that B(C˜) =
∑
i∈C˜ ci. In this case,
Φ((1, . . ., 1)) = Φ((0, . . . , 0)) = 0. If there exist some a 6= 0
such that Φ(a) > 0, then Φ(a∗)>0 and a∗ 6=0, so we are
done. If there is no such a, then we have maxa Φ(a)=0 and
(1, . . . , 1)∈ argmaxa Φ(a). Therefore, “all ISPs to deploy”
will be a robust equilibrium and in this robust equilibrium,
more than one ISPs will deploy.
Corollary 4. The ratio γ will decrease, as we increase the
incremental benefit V (f ,m) for some flow f (m<|C(f)|).
When
V (f ,m)
m
=V (f ,|C(f)|)|C(f)| for any f and m, γ=1 reaches the
minimum.
This corollary states that a better incremental deployment
mechanism reduces the required benefit-cost ratio γ, thus
increases the deployability of a new architecture. Moreover,
if the incremental deployment mechanism is good enough so
that the benefit from each flow increases linearly as more ISPs
deploy the new architecture, the required benefit-cost ratio is
1, where any profitable architecture will also be deployable.
Proof of Corollary 4. When V (f ,m)
m
=V (f ,|C(f)|)|C(f)| for any f
and m, plug this into Eq. (11), and we will get γ=1 which is
the minimum possible because γ≥1 by Corollary 1.
F. Economics Mechanism Design
Proof of Theorem 3. In the proof, we will show that to quote
higher or lower than an ISP’s launching cost will not yield a
higher utility for the ISP. To begin with, we have some lemmas
to show some properties of our mechanism.
We focus on the quoting decision of some ISP i. Suppose the
ISP i has two candidate quotes, qHi and q
L
i where q
L
i < q
H
i .
The quotes of any other ISP j is qj . Without loss of gen-
erality, the critical ISPs have indices {1, . . . , |C˜|}. Then, we
denote the quote profile qL=(q1, . . . , qi−1, qLi , qi+1, . . . , q|C˜|),
and qH=(q1, . . . , qi−1, qHi , qi+1, . . . , qN ). For presentation,
we call some set Sa an “equilibrium set”, if the corresponding
action profile a is an equilibrium.
Lemma 6. S∗(qH)⊆S∗(qL).
Proof. Recall that S∗(qH) and S∗(qL) are the solutions of
the following optimization problems:
S∗(qH) = argmax
S
|S|,
subject to φj(S, v) ≥ qj , ∀j 6= i and j ∈ S,
φi(S, v) ≥ q
H
i , if i ∈ S.
(23)
S∗(qL) = argmax
S
|S|,
subject to φj(S, v) ≥ cj , ∀j 6= i and j ∈ S,
φi(S, v) ≥ q
L
i , if i ∈ S. (24)
The fact is that S∗(qL) is the largest equilibrium when the cost
profile c=qL. This will be proved in Theorem 4. We claim
that there will be some equilibrium set S∗ ⊇ S∗(qH) when
the launching cost profile c=qL.
Case 1: i ∈ S∗(qH). The set S∗(qH) itself corresponds such
an equilibrium. Note that i ∈ S∗(qH) will deploy and her
benefit φi(S∗(qH), v) ≥ qHi > q
L
i = ci is higher than her
launching cost, so ISP i do not want to deviate. For some
other ISP j 6= i and j ∈ S∗(qH), constraints in (23) guarantee
a higher benefit than the launching cost, so such j will not
deviate. For some other j 6= i and j 6∈ S∗(qH), we have
φi(S∗(qH), v) < qi = ci, or else S∗(qH) would not be the
largest set as an optimal solution of (23) since S∗(qH) ∪ {j}
would be a larger feasible solution.
Case 2: i 6∈ S∗(qH). Every ISP does not want to devi-
ate when a set S∗(qH) of ISPs deploy, except ISP i. If
φi(S
∗(qH), v) < qLi , then ISP i also does not want to deviate.
If φi(S∗(qH), v) ≥ qLi , then by best-response, ISPs will reach
an equilibrium with a set of deployer S∗ ⊇ S∗(qH) because
the monotone utility function in a supermodular game[13].
Since some S∗ ⊇ S∗(qH) is an equilibrium set, as stated in
Lemma 5, it is contained in the largest equilibrium set S∗(qL),
S∗(qH)⊆S∗⊆S∗(qL).
Lemma 7. If i ∈ S∗(qH), then S∗(qH) = S∗(qL).
This lemma states that if an ISP i is selected for a higher
quote qHi , then the set of selected ISPs will be the same in
case that ISP i have a lower quote qLi .
Proof. To the contrary, suppose S∗(qH) ( S∗(qL). Then by
(18) we have
φj(S
∗(qL), v)≥φj(S
∗(qH), v), ∀j.
Also, because i ∈ S∗(qH) we have φi(S∗(qH), v)≥qHi , so
φi(S
∗(qL), v)≥φi(S
∗(qH), v)≥qHi .
We could see that, S∗(qL) is a feasible solution to the problem
(23). Moreover, |S∗(qL)|>|S∗(qH)|, which is a contradiction
to the optimality of the set S∗(qH) for the problem (23).
Lemma 8. Suppose i 6∈S∗(qH). If i∈S∗(qL), then
φi(S∗(qL), v)<qHi .
This lemma states that if ISP i is not selected with the higher
quote qHi , then its distributed benefit will be lower than q
H
i
even if she is selected by the lower quote qLi .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that the ISP i∈S∗(qL) and
φi(S∗(qL), v)≥qHi . Then we could see S
∗(qL) is also a
feasible set for the problem (23) because the constraints
for the other ISPs are also satisfied. Furthermore, we know
S∗(qH) ⊆ S∗(qL) from Lemma 6. Moreover, i ∈ S∗(qL)
and i 6∈ S∗(qH). Therefore, |S∗(qL|)>v|S∗(qH)|, which is a
contradiction to the optimality of the set S∗(qH) for problem
(23).
Now, we go back to our Theorem 3. Denote ISP i’s utility
as Ui(qi) when her quote is qi.
First, we show that for any ISP i, decreasing the quote down
to ci will not hurt her utility, i.e. Ui(ci) ≥ Ui(q) for any q ≥ ci.
On one side, suppose with the orginal quote qi ≥ ci, the ISP
is selected. Then by Lemma 7, we could see that the selected
set will not be changed and ISP i’s utility will be the same.
On the other, if with the original quote qi ≥ ci, the ISP is not
selected, then the original utility is 0. But with a lower quote,
she is guaranteed to be distributed a benefit higher than ci,
and therefore the utility Ui(ci) ≥ Ui(qi) = 0.
Second, we show that further decreasing the quote below ci
will not improve her utility, i.e. Ui(ci) ≥ Ui(q) for any q ≤ ci.
On one hand, suppose the ISP is selected when quoting ci,
then by Lemma 7, her utility will be unchanged from quoting
a lower value. On the other hand, if the ISP is not selected
by quoting ci, according to Lemma 8, the ISP will not be
distributed more than ci when she quote lower i.e. Ui(qL) =
φi(S∗(qL), v)−ci<0. Therefore, she will have negative utility
if she is selected with a lower quote.
Now, we have shown that Ui(ci) ≥ Ui(q) for any q.
Therefore, to quote ci is a weakly dominant strategy for ISP
i, which is regardless of other ISPs’ quotes.
Proof of Theorem 4. We first show that optimization prob-
lem (12) selects the largest equilibrium when q = c. To
the contrary, suppose the largest equilibrium is a′ and the
corresponding set of deployers is Sa′ which is not equal
to S∗(c). Then, S∗(c) ( Sa′ because Sa′ is the largest
equilibrium set. We further claim that Sa′ is a feasible solution
to satisfy the constraints (12). In fact, in the equilibrium, by
Definition 3, the utility for an ISP i ∈ Sa′ to deploy is non-
negative, i.e. φi(Sa′ , v) − ci ≥ 0. Now, we find a feasible
solution Sa′ and |Sa′ | > |S∗(c)|, which is a contradiction to
the optimality of S∗(c).
Second, we show the largest equilibrium set S∗(c), also
maximizes the total revenue gain v(·). Formally, S∗(c) is also
the solution of the following optimization problem:
maximize
S⊆C˜
v(S),
subject to φi(S, v) ≥ ci, ∀i ∈ S. (25)
In fact, we claim that some optimal solution to the problem
(25) S ′ corresponds to an equilibrium a′ where S ′ = Sa′ .
Suppose to the contrary any optimal solution S ′ does not
corresponds to an equilibrium. Then, either of the following
two cases will happen (1) there exists some ISP i ∈ S ′ such
that φi(S ′, v) < ci; (2) there is some ISP j 6∈ S ′ such
that φj(S ′ ∪ {j}, v) > cj . Case (1) will not happen because
constraints in (25) are satisfied. Therefore, we find some j 6∈ S ′
such that φj(S ′ ∪ {j}, v) > cj . Because of (18), we have
another set S ′ ∪ {j} that satisfies the constraints in (25).
Furthermore, v(S ′∪{j})−v(S ′) ≥ φj(S ′∪{j}, v) > cj ≥ 0.
It means that we find another feasible solution S ′ ∪ {j} and
v(S ′∪{j}) > v(S ′), which is a contradiction to the optimality
of S ′. Since an maximizer of problem (25) comes some
equilibrium. The largest equilibrium a∗ will be the one that
yields the highest value v(Sa∗) because of the monotonicity
of v(·) indicated by our Assumption 2.
Third, we show that S∗(c), the largest equilibrium, also
maximizes the utility ui of each individual ISPs. Formally,
S∗(c) is the optimal solution of the following problem:
maximize
S⊆C˜
ui(S, v), (∀i ∈ C˜)
subject to φj(S, v) ≥ cj , ∀j ∈ S. (26)
We claim that some optimal solution of the problem (26)
corresponds to an equilibrium. Assume to the contrary that
no optimal solution is an equilibrium. In a similar logic of
the previous part, for some optimal solution S∗, we can have
some j 6∈ S∗ and S∗ ∪ {j} is also a feasible solution of
(26). If S∗ ∪ {j} still does not correspond to an equilib-
rium, then we continue this expansion until we reach some
equilibrium. Such expansion procedure has an end because
the set of all ISPs is finite. When the expansion stops, we
obtain some T ∗ ) S∗, that satisfies the constraints (26) and
corresponds to an equilibrium. By monotonicity of ui, we have
ui(S
∗, v) ≤ ui(T
∗, v) and we find another optimal solution
T ∗ that is an equilibrium, which is an contradiction to our
assumption that no optimal solution is an equilibrium. As some
equilibrium is in the optimal solution, we could see that the
largest equilibrium Sa∗ yields the maximal ui(Sa∗ , v) when
i ∈ Sa∗ . In the other cases where j 6∈ Sa∗ , the ISP j does
not belong to any other equilibrium set either, i.e. j 6∈ Sa∗ if
a
∗ is an equilibrium. Thus, the optimal value that comes from
some equilibrium uj(S∗, v)=0. Hence, for j 6∈Sa∗ , the largest
equilibrium also achieve the highest utility of j that is 0.
G. Tipping Set Selecting Algorithm
The selected set of ISPs should satisfy the constraints in
(12), so we define a “valid” tipping set as follows:
Definition 6. Given the set of currently deployed ISPs S, a set
T is a valid tipping set if T ∩S=∅, T 6=∅, and φi(S∪T , v)≥qi
for all i∈S∪T .
After a valid tipping-set of ISPs are selected to deploy,
the ISPs will reach an equilibrium S ′ that is larger than
S∪T by best-response dynamics defined before. This property
defends the name “tipping set”. To reduce the number of
selected ISPs, the coordinator wants to select as less ISPs
as possible, which corresponds to the minimal tipping set.
Temporarily, let us abstract the details to find the minimal valid
tipping set given the current deployment set S in a function
MinimalTippingSet(S). Now, we informally describe our
improved assignment scheme in the procedure below:
Algorithm 1: Improved assignment scheme
1 while S is not the largest equilibrium do
2 T ←MinimalTippingSet(S)
3 Assign the set T of ISPs to deploy
4 S← equilibrium from S ∪ T by best-response
dynamics
The problem to find the find the minimal valid tipping set
could be formalized below:
minimize
T 6=∅,T ∩S=∅
|T |,
subject to φi(S∪T , v)≥qi, ∀i ∈ S∪T . (27)
This problem is NP-hard even if we restrict φi to be a
supermodular function. We propose a hueristic greedy algo-
rithm to address this computational challenge. Our aim is to
select the minimal number of ISPs so that constraints in (27)
is satisfied. We characterize the violation of the constraint
for ISP i as the gap before the constraint is satisfied, i.e.
gi,max{ci − ϕi(S, v), 0}. For a set S of ISPs, we define
the total gap as gap(S),
∑
i∈S gi. When gap(S ∪T ) = 0, all
the constraints in (27) are satisfied. The algorithm is presented
in Algorithm 2. In Line 2-6, we greedily select an ISP that
minimizes the total gap, and repeat this selection until the
total gap reduces to 0. If S ∪ T reaches the whole set N , we
set S ∪ T as the largest equilibrium Sa∗ . At the point before
Line 7, gap(S ∪ T ) = 0 and all the constraints are satisfied.
But the greedily selected ISPs could be further squeezed. In
Line 7-8, we keep removing the ISPs whose leaving will keep
the total gap to be 0.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 will terminate, and the system
eventually reaches the largest equilibrium.
Proof. We claim that in each iteration of the while loop in
Algorithm 1, the set S will expand if it does not represent
the largest equilibrium. If this claim holds, the while loop will
terminate, because the number of ISPs is finite.
Now, we show that Algorithm 2 returns a non-empty set T
when the input S corresponds to some equilibrium. Suppose
to the contrary that T = ∅, then for the last ISP j eliminated
in Line 8, we have gap(S ∪ {j}) = 0 because of the
Algorithm 2: MinimalTippingSet(S)
1 T ← {j} (j is randomly chosen from N − S)
2 while gap(S ∪ T ) 6= 0 do
3 if S ∪ T = N then
4 T ← Sa∗ − S, break
5 i← argmini∈(N−T −S) gap(S ∪ T ∪ {i})
6 T ← T ∪ {i}
7 while ∃j ∈ S, such that gap(S ∪ T − {j}) = 0 do
8 (randomly choose such j), T ← T − {j}
9 return T
property governed by the while loop. Now, S is no longer
an equilibrium because j is willing to deploy, which is a
contradiction. When T 6= ∅, the equilibrium from S ∪ T in
Line 4 of Algorithm 1 will be larger than S because the ISPs
in S always want to deploy according to the supermodularity
of the utility function.
Our tipping set selection scheme keeps the property that
the ISPs will reach the largest equilibrium, so the desirable
properties in Theorem 3 and 4 still hold. Meanwhile, the
improved selection scheme reduces the number of assigned
ISPs so that the mechanism is easier to operate.
